Telecom Immunity

If you don't like the idea of people you don't know, who work zealously for an administration hellbent on little else aside from attaining power, listening to your telephone conversations, you absolutely must read this article. I know I've touted the Dan Froomkin before, but this one is important. He breaks down, point by point, the Administration's argument for giving retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies who surrendered private data without a warrant. Because it's important, I'll give you the ten cent summary:

Bush's case for telecom immunity:

1) We told them it was legal, and they helped us out because we said we needed it as a matter of national security. It wouldn't be fair to hold them responsible because we told them it was legal.

2) Lawsuits will inevitably lead to disclosure of information about the program that needs to be kept secret from the enemy.

3) If we don't protect them from breaking the law to help us in the past, they won't break the law to help us in the future.


Counterpoint:

1) The suits in question specify that the plaintiffs will only seek damages if it is determined that the surveillance was conducted on "millions of people, not just communications involving terrorism suspects overseas." If anyone remembers the Specter-Whitehouse amendment to the FISA bill a few weeks ago, it suggested that since the government did assure the telecoms that what they were doing was legal, the government should take their place as the defendant.

2) Long before story was broken, terrorists were likely expecting that their phones were being tapped. The real question is the scope of people who aren't terrorists whose phones were being tapped. Furthermore, any evidence that must clearly be kept secret can be kept out of the public record.

3) If we don't protect them from breaking the law to help the government in the past, it means that they will only turn over information legally, with a warrant to do so.